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THE USE OF ADR INVOLVING LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE
NEW YORK CITY CORPORATION COUNSEL
Michael A. Cardozo*

PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Before I begin I want to say just a few words about the man for
whom this Dispute Resolution Center is named, John Feerick. I
have known John for many years in a variety of contexts, as a
friend, as a chair of numerous committees, as an arbitrator, and as
a mediator. I succeeded him as chair of one committee, the Fund
for Modern Courts, and I was fortunate enough to be the extraordinary beneficiary of another committee he headed, the Nominating Committee of the City Bar Association. I have tried cases
before John in his role as an arbitrator, including a case involving
one of John’s few mistakes, the Latrell Sprewell—choking the
coach—NBA matter.1 But I have prevailed in other arbitrations
before John, including one argued in the New York Court of Appeals earlier this week—living proof that he usually calls them
right. And for two years I worked with John as he served as one of
three Special Masters in the McCain homeless family rights
litigation.2
Based on my long acquaintance with John I can say without fear
of contradiction that not only does he excel, with the exception of
the Sprewell case, in whatever he does, but if John, in his low key
but very effective way of speaking, says “I think you should do X,
Y or Z,” the person to whom his comments are directed inevitably
tries very hard to do as John suggests. As Linda Gibbs, the Deputy
Mayor for Health and Human Services and the former Commissioner of the Department of Homeless Services, said from this podium just a few weeks ago at the dedication ceremonies for the
John Feerick Center, “While I hated to compromise, when John
* Michael A. Cardozo is New York City Corporation Counsel. This speech was
delivered at the Fordham Dispute Resolution Society Symposium on October 13,
2006. The author acknowledges with thanks the assistance in preparing these remarks
of Assistant Corporation Counsel Michael Pastor, as well as the advice of many of his
colleagues at the New York City Law Department.
1. See generally Mike Wise, NBA Star Who Choked Coach Wins Reinstatement of
Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1998, at A1.
2. McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109 (N.Y. 1987).
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made a suggestion I found it very hard to say no.” “He taught
me,” Linda said, “how to compromise for the greater good.”
Fordham Law School, and all of New York City, is very fortunate
to have John Feerick spearhead this Center, and certainly this Symposium is an auspicious beginning for the work the Center will do.
INTRODUCTION
I want to advance my central thesis at the outset: alternative dispute resolution can sometimes be a very useful and powerful tool in
resolving social problems in which local governments find themselves. But ADR is not the answer to resolving much of the litigation involving disputes over governmental policy. In fact, serious
adverse social consequences can result from the too frequent demand that some form of alternate dispute resolution—rather than
the courts—be used to resolve a particular controversy.
Generally, there are three different types of governmental disputes potentially susceptible to ADR treatment.
To the first category—money disputes between the City and a
claimant or group of plaintiffs—I give a blinking green light to the
use of ADR. To the second category—land use and environmental
controversies involving the City and citizens claiming to be aggrieved by a particular zoning, environmental, or development decision—I give a blinking red light. The final category, to which I
will devote most of my attention this morning, involves claims by a
particular group of people, usually an advocacy group on behalf of
the poor, that a specific social policy being pursued or not pursued
by the government is somehow illegal. And to that category of
cases I post a yellow light.
MONEY DISPUTES
The first topic I will discuss will be the hundreds if not thousands
of damages suits any local government, and certainly New York
City, faces every year. While such cases are not the focus of this
Symposium, briefly discussing when ADR should be used to resolve such cases offers some guidance on when and how ADR can
be used to resolve social policy disputes, which is our primary focus
today.
Each year New York City faces over 8,000 damages suits. These
cases result in the City, and therefore City taxpayers, paying on
average more than $515 million a year in judgments and settlements, although the good news is that the number has been somewhat declining in recent years. This is a tremendous amount of
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money; in fact, it reflects approximately three percent of the discretionary portion of New York City’s entire budget.3 Therefore,
every effort must be made to ensure that payments are being made
only to those who have in fact been damaged by improper City
action, that those injured are being compensated only for the
amount of their injuries and not more, and at the same time that
those injured by wrongful City action are in fact being fairly
compensated.
The damages cases faced by the City range from minor sidewalk
slip-and-falls to multi-million dollar medical malpractice claims, to
discrimination litigations and suits under federal civil rights statutes challenging the legality of a particular governmental action,
usually involving the police or correction departments. While
these are primarily individual damages suits they also include
larger tort claims, such as health claims arising from 9/11,4 the
deaths and serious injuries resulting from the Staten Island Ferry
disaster,5 or class action discrimination suits, including one that
Ken Feinberg helped to resolve.
Frequently disputes of this type, like comparable cases in the private sector, can and should be resolved through alternate dispute
resolution. But, and I underscore the “but,” this is not always true.
There are two very important considerations in damages suits involving the government that are not always present in private sector disputes, considerations that often point to rejecting alternate
dispute resolution mechanisms as a means for resolving the case.
First, if every would-be plaintiff is under the impression—and
too many in fact are—that if she sues the City, no matter how weak
the case, the courts will force the City to use alternative dispute
resolution to settle for some amount of money, the taxpayer will
unfairly suffer. A government must make crystal clear that it is not
a deep pocket waiting to be picked. This is all the more true when
the volume of litigation faced by the City is recognized. New York
City is a party to over twenty percent of all civil litigation in the
state courts in the five boroughs and to approximately twenty to
3. See NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FINANCIAL PLAN SUMMARY, FISCAL YEARS 2007-2011, at 23 (2007), available
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/pdf/sum1_07.pdf, (listing “controllable” agency
spending at $18.88 billion).
4. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, KEYNOTE ADDRESS, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 785
(2007).
5. For an account of the disaster, see for example, Janny Scott & William K.
Rashbaum, The Ferry Crash: Overview; 10 Die as Staten Island Ferry Slams into Pier,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003, at A1.
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thirty percent of all civil cases in the Southern District of New
York. And in federal cases the City is often facing an additional
demand for attorney’s fees authorized by many federal statutes.
Thus, when the City takes a “no-settle” position because the case is
particularly egregious in its lack of merit, or a plaintiff with an arguably valid claim insists upon inflated damages, the City will not
(and I submit should not) be asked to go to some form of ADR—
usually mediation—and resolve the case for a few dollars simply
because the City will otherwise incur litigation costs.
Unlike many private litigants, for whom settling the occasional
damages suit will be less expensive than litigating, for the City to
resolve meritless disputes for even a relatively minor amount is
wrong and expensive. Mediators and courts, which see a token settlement via ADR as a useful means to clear their crowded dockets,
should not ask the City to engage in such tactics. To do otherwise
would result in an increase, not a decrease, in litigation, and would
cost the taxpayer still more money.
In evaluating whether the City should use some form of mediation to resolve damages cases, a second important variable that is
not always present in a private sector dispute is the needed preparation time. Effective ADR generally requires the attorneys on
each side to become familiar with the facts of the particular case.
Given the volume of City damages suits—approximately fifty tort
cases are sent to trial every week—and the need for both the Corporation Counsel’s Office and the Comptroller’s Office to approve
any settlement, the City simply cannot afford the time to prepare
to resolve through ADR even a fraction of such cases. Many of
those cases settle just before, or during, trial. It is simply not cost
effective for the City to spend time preparing to resolve a $25,000
case through ADR—particularly a labor intensive summary jury
trial as some have suggested—when the odds are overwhelming
that such a case will be resolved anyway.
Those caveats aside, ADR in government damages litigations,
especially as some form of mediation, may be an effective process.
Over the last ten years, the City, by using court-mandated mediation in the typical tort case, has been able to resolve meritorious
claims more quickly and less expensively, and to reduce its backlog
of pending cases by half. In the larger damages cases, ADR may
also be an effective tool, as highlighted by a recent successful pilot
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program the City engaged in involving major medical malpractice
cases.6
I hasten to add that this does not mean that every major damages case in which a governmental entity finds itself should be resolved by ADR. For example, there may be critical issues of law
that first need to be resolved. If the government prevails on the
legal issue, not only will no liability result, but an important precedent will have been established that will guide future conduct.7
Moreover, resolving large damages cases through ADR, particularly at an early stage before legal issues are resolved and discovery
has been completed, may encourage plaintiffs to bring still more,
frequently non-meritorious cases.
A scalpel, not a sledgehammer, must therefore be the standard
when deciding whether ADR should be used to help resolve damages suits against a city. This is why, as I said above, I apply a
blinking green light to this first category of cases.
LAND USE DISPUTES
This brings me to the second category of public disputes potentially resolvable by ADR: land use cases. I am referring here to
claims of arbitrary zoning decisions, inadequate environmental reviews, or conflicts of interest over a particular redevelopment
project.
Consider the typical land use transaction. In one scenario, the
government planning commission decides that as a result of changing times and needs, zoning in a particular neighborhood needs to
be altered from manufacturing to commercial. In another case, a
private entity proposes to buy an under-used or vacant public
building and put it to a new use. In a third example, the govern6. Pursuant to this pilot program, of the nineteen cases where the parties participated in mediation, thirteen reached settlement. The program demonstrated some of
the numerous positive attributes of ADR. First, the parties to these mediations—
plaintiffs, defendants, and their attorneys—viewed them as “fair, satisfying, and responsive to their interests.” Chris S. Hyman & Clyde B. Schechter, Mediating Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Against Hospitals: New York City’s Pilot Project, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 1394, 1398 (2006). Second, transaction costs were notably lower in comparison
with litigation. Indeed, attorneys for both sides estimated that they spent approximately one-tenth the amount of time preparing for mediation as they would have
spent preparing for trial. Lastly, the study demonstrated an association (if not a
causal link) between defendants’ ability to offer an apology in the appropriate case
and settlement. See id.; see also Amy G. London, Mediation Offers Promise, But No
Cure for System’s Ills, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 16, 2006.
7. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution,
62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1987) (arguing that ADR proponents undervalue positive
law and the guidance function of court decisions).
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ment decides it should convert private property to a particular public use, such as a homeless shelter. In each of these examples
affected residents of the community or the general public, unhappy
about the proposed change in their neighborhood, sue after the
governmental decision has been reached, claiming that the relevant
statutes were somehow violated. Should the court, on the return
date of the inevitable preliminary injunction motion, direct the parties to seek to resolve the matter by resorting to some kind of alternate dispute mechanism? In most cases, the answer should be a
loud “No!” In fact, to insist upon some kind of mediation in these
cases subverts the very land use process that the plaintiffs usually
argue was not followed.
Recent concrete examples of these hypothetical controversies include the disputes over the development of the West Side railroad
yards,8 the Atlantic Yards development in Brooklyn,9 the construction of a new Yankee Stadium,10 the sale and redesign of the Huntington Hartford Gallery of Modern Art in Columbus Circle,11 the
reopening of the 91st Street Waste Transfer Station,12 and the relocation of tenants from the Bronx Terminal Market.13 And for each
headline-grabbing dispute of this nature there have been scores of
other less publicized local land use controversies, ones that nevertheless affect a significant portion of a particular community.
In these kinds of cases, the challenged governmental decision
has already been preceded by an extensive public review process
mandated by state and local law. In effect, that process has already
provided for alternate dispute resolution, albeit before the litigation began. In New York City, for example, under the Chartermandated Uniform Land Use Review Procedure, popularly known
as ULURP,14 before any major land use or zoning change can be
made, there is an extensive public review process that, on average,
8. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. N.Y. Metro. Transp. Auth., 799 N.Y.S.2d 186
(App. Div. 2005), appeal dismissed as moot, 5 N.Y.3d 878 (N.Y. 2005).
9. Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 816 N.Y.S.2d
424 (App. Div. 2006).
10. Save Our Parks v. City of New York, No. 110836/06, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
2365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2006).
11. Landmark West! v. Burden, 790 N.Y.S.2d 107 tbl. 1 (App. Div. 2005).
12. ACORN v. Bloomberg, No. 114729/05, 2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 51750U (Sup. Ct.
Sept. 19, 2006).
13. See Sigmund Strauss, Inc. v. Strategic Dev. Concepts, Inc., No. 103443/05, 2006
N.Y. Slip Op. 50008U (Sup. Ct. Jan. 3, 2006).
14. For more details on the New York City Uniform Land Use Review Procedure,
see New York City Dep’t of City Planning, Uniform Land Use Review Procedure,
http://home.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/luproc/ulpro.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
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lasts eight months. It includes preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement, public hearings before the local community board, Borough President review, a public hearing by the
Planning Commission, and often City Council hearings and
approval.15
In addition, recent years have seen the emergence of so-called
Community Benefit Agreements in which a developer, in the give
and take before a zoning or land use change is approved, agrees in
writing to make certain benefits available to the community, such
as hiring a certain percentage of construction workers from within
the borough, providing for affordable housing, or planting more
trees. In effect, the Community Benefit Agreement, in which the
community and the developer reach compromises on the particular
transaction, is a form of mediation before litigation even begins. In
fact, in some high profile development disputes, a trained
facilitator has been part of the discussions between the community
and the developer.
Therefore, when a final decision in a land use case is challenged
in court, the back and forth and inevitable compromises resulting
from the public process have already taken place. For a court then
to direct the parties to see if, through an alternative dispute resolution process, they could somehow resolve factual disputes already
decided—or compromise still more of their differences—ignores
the compromises that have already occurred and will make compromises in future disputes difficult to reach. Insisting on ADR in
these cases will encourage litigation—after all, the neighborhood
advocacy group will know they may gain still more by suing—and
will discourage would-be developers from compromising during
the public process, since they will know they may have to make still
further concessions when the suit is commenced and the matter is
sent to ADR.
An additional pernicious consequence of sending disputes like
these to ADR is significant delay. When a land use challenge is
brought, the court, on the return date of the motion, will invariably
ask the City not to move ahead until it has had an opportunity to
review the papers. While this is certainly an understandable response from the court, the cost to the public can be huge. The
project is not allowed to go forward until the judge decides the
15. See generally N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, ch. 6, pt. 617 (2006); N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 197-c, 197-d
(2005); N.Y. CITY, N.Y., RULES tit. 62, § 5 (2005); N.Y. CITY, N.Y., RULES tit. 43, § 6
(2005).
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motion. While theoretically the law requires a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction against a project to post a bond,16 as a practical matter judges, particularly in state court, tend to avoid the
requirement—or require only a token bond—on the theory that
the challenge is being brought in the public interest.
While the problem of delayed decision making in cases like these
exists even without court-ordered ADR, the potential of an ADR
alternative compounds the problem of delay. The project is stalled
while the ADR representative selected by the court tries to resolve
the matter consensually. The delay continues until, as will invariably be the case, the mediator and the court are finally persuaded
that the City will refuse to make any concessions in the ADR process for the reasons to which I have alluded. Only then will the
court that has put off deciding the matter in the hope it will be
resolved through ADR begin to review and then finally decide the
case. On some occasions, the litigation becomes a form of coercion; the City is forced to make concessions, despite all the concerns about compromise I have just expressed, because the delay
engendered by the litigation—compounded by the matter’s referral
to ADR—threatens to derail the entire project.
By saying this I do not mean to suggest that the challenged governmental action should be immune from judicial review. That is
not the case. If the environmental review is deemed inadequate, if
the government action is found arbitrary, or if the public official
was compromised, it is the obligation of the court to so rule. In
sum, it is wrong for the court, after all the public process that preceded the court proceeding, to try to force a compromise concerning the challenged action.
SOCIAL POLICY DISPUTES
I come now to the third category of government disputes that
might be susceptible to ADR resolution, and the one that this Symposium is particularly focusing upon: public policy disputes involving the poor. And to this area of dispute I apply a yellow light.
ADR can be a highly constructive method of seeking to resolve
public policy disputes—in the right case, at the right time, with the
right processes, and with the right mediator.
By public policy disputes I mean cases against the government
involving the rights and treatment of the most vulnerable in our
society: children, the poor, the elderly, and the homeless. Unlike
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(c); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6312(b) (McKinney 2006).
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the land use cases these disputes are usually not matters where the
litigation has been preceded by a lengthy public process; and unlike
most damages or land use cases, the aggrieved parties are generally
the indigent. During my tenure as Corporation Counsel, I have
found these public policy cases to be the most difficult to resolve,
either consensually or by litigation.
While sub-dividing these types of cases is somewhat artificial,
they fall into three broad areas: constitutional challenges, statutory
interpretation issues, and factual disputes over whether the government is complying with particular mandates. The latter is the most
promising source of ADR treatment.
I share the view of many scholars who have expressed concern
over delegating to persons other than duly selected judges determination of major public policy issues involving constitutional questions.17 To be overly simplistic, many argue that whether the
Constitution prohibits separate but equal treatment of minorities is
not something that can or should be decided by any institution
other than the judiciary. Closer to home, the question of whether
the New York State Constitution requires local governments to
provide shelter to the homeless,18 or mandates that the State spend
the money to provide all public school children with a sound basic
education,19 are questions that should not be resolved in an ADR
context. The government, the argument goes, should not be taking
it upon itself to delegate the critical public policy choices that stem
from answers to these weighty constitutional issues. Given the extraordinary economic and social consequences that flow from such
decisions—for example, a requirement that the State increase by
up to $5.6 billion each year the amount of money it provides for
the education of New York City’s school children20—it is essential
17. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 676 (1986) (“An oft-forgotten virtue of
adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and application of public values.”); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing
that the role of courts is not to “maximize the ends of private parties, . . . but to
explicate and give force to the authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes”).
18. See McCain v. Koch, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div. 1986), rev’d on other
grounds, 70 N.Y.2d 109 (N.Y. 1987).
19. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (N.Y. 2003). For
a discussion of Ohio’s efforts to mediate disputes over school funding, see Molly
Townes O’Brien, At the Intersection of Public Policy and Private Process: Court-Ordered Mediation and the Remedial Process in School Funding Litigation, 18 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 437-438 (2003) (citing failure of mediation in Ohio school
dispute but arguing that mediation may work under certain conditions).
20. See Fiscal Equity, 100 N.Y.2d at 929-30.
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that, for the public to accept such results, they must be rendered by
the branch of government created to decide such matters, not privately selected decision makers. Similarly, whether a statute requires the government to provide certain services or take particular
action are issues that should be decided by judges, not by contractually selected mediators.21 Even if questions like these could be
compromised in some way, it is wrong of government not to insist
that the issues be decided by the courts.
But when the questions presented are primarily factual—such as
whether the shelter system is providing adequate shelter, as relevant statutes require, or whether the City is meeting the statutory
requirements of providing bi-lingual education, or timely processing food stamp applications—the questions may be ones that are
ripe for decision outside the usual judicial framework.22 ADR allows factual disputes of this nature to be resolved informally,
outside the glare of the publicity of a courtroom, and permits the
parties to work together to try to reach an agreement on resolving
particular problems.
In discussing this issue, I want to begin by emphasizing one critical point that is too frequently overlooked by many. Judicial supervision of a government agency or program—either through
injunctions or consent decrees—is bad social policy and should be
used only as a last resort. Under our system of government it is
mayors and commissioners, not courts or special masters or
mediators or outside monitors, that are supposed to run the government. It is the mayor and the City Council, not the courts, who
have been elected to decide how particular social problems should
be resolved, and how scarce City resources should be allocated.
The difficult question presented by these social policy disputes is
what the courts should do when it is alleged, and sometimes
proven, that the government is not doing what the constitution and
statutes require. How do you insist that the government come into
compliance with the law and, at the same time, not make the
21. See Peter R. Streenland & Peter A. Appel, The Ongoing Role of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Federal Government Litigation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 807-08
(1996) (citing cases where the federal government requires a court’s statutory
interpretation).
22. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 680 (citing positively to employment discrimination cases as suitable for mediation as they are “highly fact-bound” and subject to
established principles of law); see also Michelle Ryan, Comment, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Environmental Cases: Friend or Foe?, 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 397, 412
(1997) (“[M]ost analysts agree that ADR techniques should only be used in disputes
involving well-established legal principles where the main dispute is factual.”).

R
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agency a ward of the court forever, hamstringing the creativity and
independence of the particular commissioner?
Three cases involving social policy disputes in New York City,
each invoking ADR at a different stage in the litigation, offer some
useful examples of what does and does not work when an ADR
approach is used to help resolve a public policy dispute.
Let me start with the Sheppard case,23 which involved alleged
violence by prison guards in a maximum-security unit at Rikers Island. As the trial date approached, the parties agreed to use the
experts each had separately retained for trial to jointly assist them
in reaching what became the Stipulation of Settlement. The Stipulation, which imposed certain mandatory obligations on the City,
could be terminated by the court after two years, on defendant’s
motion, unless the court found “that prospective relief remains
necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of the plaintiff
class’ constitutional rights.”24
At the end of the first two-year period, the City, after reviewing
the joint experts’ report, agreed to extend the stipulation for an
additional period in order to further the goal of full compliance.
As the next potential ending date approached, both experts were in
agreement that the City had changed its procedures sufficiently to
allow the stipulation to expire. The court, after reviewing the expert reports, terminated the stipulation, noting that the experts had
concluded that facility management had made “substantial progress in institutionalizing the important remedial measures embodied in the stipulation.”25 The court emphasized that the expert
consultants had been “crucial” to the success of the settlement.26
What did the ADR process achieve here? It allowed for two
highly recognized experts to assist the parties in finding common
ground, to offer their views of whether compliance had been
achieved and, as a result of that role, to participate in helping the
City devise better methods to solve the underlying social problem:
the control of violence in a particular prison unit. When the
changes their presence had encouraged were implemented—and
were proven to be successful—the case came to an end. Rather
23. See Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
24. Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 103, Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 91 Civ. 4148).
25. See Sheppard, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (internal citation omitted).
26. Id. at 459. The court also hailed the work of all parties in implementing the
Stipulation’s reforms: “[The parties’] combined actions showed not only attention to
detail in crafting the Stipulation, but also diligence in overseeing its implementation in
the highest tradition of the legal profession.” Id. at 459-60.
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than publicly litigating for years over whether the City’s changes
had resulted in compliance, the experts, working with the parties,
helped reform the practices in this maximum-security unit.
A second case, Marisol,27 involving a long running challenge to
the way that New York City monitored and served the welfare of
the City’s children, offers a different approach. On the eve of trial,
and after years of litigation in the Southern District of New York,
the parties reached a settlement. The settlement agreement imposed no injunctive relief. Instead, the court and the parties
agreed to the appointment of an outside advisory panel of experts
that would have no coercive powers except to the extent it would
file periodic (and purely advisory) reports with the court regarding
the City’s efforts in reforming its child welfare agency. The case
could be reinstituted, or interim injunctive relief sought, only upon
a finding by the panel that the City’s child welfare agency was “not
acting in good faith in making efforts toward reform.”28 After two
years, when the advisory panel found that the City was making
substantial progress in the challenged areas, the case was, for all
intents and purposes, over. The commissioner, however, citing the
constructive role the panel had played, voluntarily agreed to have
the panel continue making periodic reports to him.
Although there were no mediators used in resolving the Marisol
litigation, the resolution of the case itself contemplated the future
use of outside experts, as opposed to constant court supervision.
The case ended without either a consent decree or an injunction.
Through the selection of highly qualified experts, who publicly reported on progress the agency was making in areas of reform, litigation over a major social problem involving one of the most
vulnerable sectors of our society—children at risk—was dismissed,
and the need for a trial and subsequent court intervention and supervision was avoided.
It is the homeless litigation, known as McCain,29 and particularly
my personal experiences with it, from which I have learned the
most about the role ADR can play in resolving social policy disputes when the government is involved. While the case, and ADR
efforts to resolve it, could be the subject of a book, not simply short
mention in a speech, what follows is a brief description. In 1986
27. See Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
28. Settlement Agreement at ¶ 26, Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 185
F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (No. 95 Civ. 10533).
29. See generally McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, (N.Y. 1987); McCain v. Bloomberg, No. 41023/83, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 51435U (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 2005).
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the Appellate Division, First Department, in the context of affirming a preliminary injunction, ruled there was a state constitutional right to shelter in New York.30 Over the next twenty years,
and continuing up to today, there have been scores of applications
to the court, resulting in more than fifty separate orders, in which
the plaintiffs claimed that the City was not providing the required
shelter benefits in violation of the constitution, various state and
local laws, regulations, and policy directives. These laws range
from the type of shelter to be provided, to the type of health services to be afforded, to the time of day when shelter applications
must be processed.
At first, these applications, which frequently alleged that the
City was in contempt, were heard directly by the court, with the
inevitable publicity that accompanied such proceedings. In 1994,
the court, with the consent of the parties, appointed a mediator/
facilitator, my friend Ken Feinberg, to help resolve such applications.31 For the next eight years Ken, and later an individual designated by him to serve on his behalf, heard the complaints made by
plaintiffs, ably represented by Steve Banks of the Legal Aid Society, alleging that the City was doing something wrong, either in
regard to a specific family or on a more systemic level.32 Many of
those disputes were resolved behind the scenes by the mediator,
but others played out in the public sphere as one side or the other
took its case to the public, or sought relief before the judge when
conflicts could not be consensually resolved. Suffice it to say that
for over eight years the homeless litigation was in the public eye.
The City was often found to have been in violation of the law, and
the mediator strove mightily to resolve issue after issue that arose.
The role of the mediator was primarily to evaluate, and to try to
resolve, specific factual disputes raised before him.
Fast-forward to 2002, and the beginning of the Bloomberg Administration. For a while there was no mediator at all and things
seemingly went from bad to worse, with contentious contempt and
related applications being made directly to the court.33 Finally, after intense negotiations over ADR process, a new approach was
tried. Four crucial elements were agreed upon by the parties and
30. McCain, 70 N.Y.2d at 120-21.
31. See Nichole M. Christian, Expansion of Homeless Center Hours Is Urged, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998, at B5.
32. See id.
33. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Mayor’s Style Is Tested in Sending Homeless to Old
Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2002, at B1.
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the court. First, there would be a three-person ADR panel, composed not only of a traditional ADR specialist—here the Dean of
ADR, John Feerick—but also two non-lawyers who were trained
and had extensive experience not in ADR, but in the very social
science and social welfare issues that lay at the heart of the homelessness issues. Second, this three-person panel was given the authority to resolve disputes, privately, with the right of appeal to the
court by either side sharply limited. Third, the panel was charged
with the duty not only to resolve these disputes but also to evaluate
all aspects of the family shelter system and to recommend improvements. Finally, the panel was given the role, by the end of the twoyear period during which this ADR agreement existed, to recommend how the litigation should be brought to an end.
The ultimate results were excellent—attributable, I believe, to
each of these four elements. For the two years the Stipulation was
in effect the Department of Homeless Services was freed from the
constant threat of being hauled into a public court proceeding,
under the threat of contempt, for alleged violations. Instead, when
there was claimed wrongdoing the dispute was resolved, usually
consensually, with the aid of the Special Master Panel (the “SMP,”
as we affectionately referred to it) in the privacy of an SMP hearing. Not a single ruling of the SMP was appealed to the court. This
meant that Department of Homeless personnel, rather than being
under constant siege to testify and justify their actions at depositions and court hearings, could concentrate instead on how to solve
the underlying problems, and to focus on new ways of approaching
them. The paralysis engendered by the threat of constant litigation, which had engulfed the agency for many years, had been
removed.
At the same time the SMP, charged with the duty of working
with the parties to resolve the underlying problems and to recommend how the litigation should be brought to an end, did just that.
It took it upon itself to study the issues, it issued three far-reaching
reports on homelessness issues, and it worked with the parties in
forging new responses to this fundamental societal issue.34 The result was not only the absence of litigation but the implementation
34. See N.Y. CITY FAMILY HOMELESSNESS SPECIAL MASTER PANEL, FAMILY
HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION REPORT (2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dhs/downloads/pdf/preventionreport.pdf; N.Y. CITY FAMILY HOMELESSNESS SPECIAL
MASTER PANEL, REPORT ON EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE UNIT AND SHELTER ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION (2004), available at http://www.cccnewyork.org/publications/
SMP%20EAU%20and%20SED2.pdf.
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of a new and highly successful approach to many of the City’s
homeless problems.35
Unfortunately, the SMP was unable to bring an end to the litigation. Consistent with its mandate to recommend when and how
the litigation should be brought to a close, the SMP, in its final
letter to the court wrote, “after twenty-two years of system-wide
litigation involving homeless families with children the City of New
York has earned the opportunity to go forward into a new era.”36
The SMP added that, although it could not agree on an exact time
frame for ending the case, it envisioned dismissal, stating that it did
not believe it “appropriate, . . . in light of all the changed circumstances, for this Court to remain in perpetual supervision of the
system for homeless children in New York City.”37 But because
only the court could end the case, and, despite intense efforts of
the panel, the parties could not reach an agreement as to how this
could be achieved, this last goal was never reached. The matter is
now back in court, with the City having made what is now a pending motion to end the case.
The homeless case, and the other social policy litigations involving the City which have been resolved (at least in part) through
ADR, lead me to conclude that ADR is the appropriate vehicle to
help to resolve many social policy disputes. The proper role of the
ADR mechanism and when it should be invoked, however, will
vary widely depending on the circumstances.
If, as may have been true at the outset of the homeless case, the
government is simply trying to put its house in order in the face of
continued findings of illegal conduct, the ADR role may be limited
to being a mediator, assisting in the resolution of the particular individual dispute. In other cases, as exemplified by the prison litigation, the right ADR mechanism may be outside experts who can
advise the court of what is proper. The wisdom and knowledge of
these experts can help bring the parties into agreement, and they
can play a major role in advising the court when it is time to end
the case. In still other cases the moral suasion of an outside panel,
such as in Marisol, can be used to report on the progress of the
agency after the case has otherwise come to end. Finally, when a
35. See sources cited supra note 34.
36. Letter from John D. Feerick, Daniel Kronenfeld, and Gail B. Nayowith, Special Masters, to Justice Helen E. Freedman, New York State Supreme Court, at 3
(submitted Feb. 9, 2005) (dated January 18, 2005) (on file with the Fordham Urban
Law Journal).
37. Id.
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completely new approach to solving the problem is needed, especially after years of litigation have created an inability of the parties to communicate effectively with one another, as was true in the
homeless litigation, a broader role, such as that exemplified by the
SMP, may be the answer.
In negotiating a potential ADR solution in these kinds of cases
two issues are frequently encountered in the discussion. First, what
will the power of the master or mediator be: adjudicator, mediator,
or monitor? Second, when will the ADR process, and the case itself, come to an end so that the agency will be free of judicial or
special master oversight? As to this latter point a successful ADR
mandate must recognize that it is the executive branch, not the
courts or the advocates, that should run government agencies. To
paraphrase the letter from the SMP in the homeless case, “We do
not believe it appropriate for this Court to remain in perpetual supervision of the system.” In seeking an ADR solution for a public
policy dispute, the ultimate goal must be both to stop the alleged
illegal practice, and to put solutions to public policy problems back
where they belong, in the hands of elected government officials.
CONCLUSION
I therefore end where I began. ADR is not the answer to the
resolution of every governmental dispute. On the other hand,
ADR, conducted by the right people, at the right time, in the right
role, can play a major constructive role in bringing social policy
disputes involving the government to an end.

